Cognition in philosophy - briefly

Astronomy Homework

The question of knowledge, its possibilities, content and boundaries represents one of the most difficult tasks, the resolution of which philosophy is engaged, and above that, he has another feature that, the more deepening above it, the more you begin to conscious of his importance, barely noticed by the first philosophers In the new philosophy, he moved to the fore. As it turned out from the historical development of the philosophy itself, first of all it is necessary to be clearly delivered and one way or another, the issue of knowledge is allowed to be then possible to begin permission and other philosophical issues. No new philosophical doctrine that could count on its further development in the future is now impossible without the theory of knowledge. In the newest scientific philosophy of our time, the theory of knowledge is required as the necessary introduction to philosophy.

No matter how much the opinions of philosophers regarding the possibility of origin and development of knowledge, but everyone is forced to recognize that without logical thinking, the development of knowledge is impossible. Even an absolute doubt that does not allow any knowledge of truth, and is trying to at least this negative result to reinforce with logical arguments. Not less unanimous, all philosophers and the fact that one thinking is still not enough to have the fact of knowledge, but that thinking should have some content that one or another is given to him. Even the one who attributes the power to the power of a small number of initial ideas to develop all knowledge must assume this at least a start.

Only with the question of how thinking is its initial content, the dispute between different directions begins. Since thinking consists only in establishing links between different parts of the heterogeneous content of our external and internal experience, then empiricism recognizes the source of all knowledge of only experience.

John Locke, one of the most important representatives of empirical philosophy

But since, on the other hand, any knowledge suggests reliability, and the last, in turn, summing up for well-known obvious positions, then, in contrast to empirism, rationalism claims that real knowledge can be developed by thinking only from such a content that, Regardless of all experience, as initially and obviously, as itself, logical thinking.

Rene Descartes, founder of new European rationalism

The claims of these both directions are trying to refute skepticism, indicating that the experience due to the deception of feelings and continuous change of phenomena is deprived of reliability, and as for logical thinking, the latter may be conveniently used to prove the provisions contrary to each other. To these three philosophical areas join, finally, criticism, which, as an impartial judge, is trying

to pay tribute to each of the mentioned areas. Empiricism, in his opinion, rights, how much the content of knowledge for experience, rationalism - how much recognizes the unconditional reliability only for those composite parts of knowledge, which cannot be derived from experience, and even skepticism is allowed to them if only the latter is limited by a negative attitude to every Attempts by dogmatic statements on the part of rationalist philosophers or empirical philosophers.

Immanuel Kant - the founder of criticism in the theory of knowledge

The main issue of the theory of knowledge is the question of the relationship, which exists between the thought and reality, between the knowledgeative creature and the subject of the subject or, as philosophers are expressed, between the subject and the object, the theory of knowledge, from which modern scientific philosophy proceeds, puts on its foundation Inspection bond existing between the subject and the object. Our views are originally objects themselves. In the initial "presentation-object" it is impossible to find neither the concepts of the object nor the concept of a thinking subject, as such, but it is both both and other, and conceivable and thinking. Only theoretical reflection destroys this unity and separates the representation from the object. But since this unity is broken, once the cognition from the naive form, which has not yet known the difference between the presentation and the object, passed to the reflecting form of knowledge, which the presentation object contrasts the very presentation, is more impossible to return to naive understanding. However, it is possible to reflect the two requirements that should serve as a basis for all considerations about the attitude of a thinking subject to the conceivable object. The first requirement is that we should always keep in mind that the distinguishes between the concepts performed by distracted thinking, only then proves the separation of the objects themselves of these concepts, if the products of distraction distinguishes are really possible, as divided into direct perception. The second requirement is to always clearly realize the motives, which encourage distracted thinking to its distinction, and to borrow only from these motifs to borrow point of view, according to which we judge the real meaning of the distinction made. This last requirement indicates to us the path that should be kept when discussing the problem of knowledge in philosophy. First of all, the question of psychological motives encouraging distracted thinking to divide the initial "presentation-object" to the submitted object and representing the subject, and then, as the second task, the question of the logical value of these motives and about the consequences that, in accordance with this may be derived from them for our understanding of reality.

Thus, the subject from which the general philosophical theory of knowledge should proceed, there is a "presentation object" with all the properties that it directly possesses, therefore, also in particular with the property of being a real object. Trying to trace the correct sequence of the motives that arise in the thinking and their effect on the development of concepts, we will need, depending on the genus and the volume of intellectual functions used at the same time, distinguish between certain levels of knowledge, which can briefly be designated as perceiving, ionic and reasonable knowledge. To the field of the first one should include all those transformations that initial "presentations-objects" are subjected, unless these transformations are performed within ordinary processes of perception, without auxiliary means and methods of scientific education. All those improvements and additions that are entered into the content and connection of representations through the methodological logical analysis are counted to the rational knowledge. Finally, under the

name of rational knowledge should be understood by all the efforts of thinking to associate individual reasonable cognition results in one whole.

But, thus delimiting these different levels of knowledge, it is necessary to beware of understanding them, as specifically different, sharply divided into reality forms of knowledge. The same whole spiritual activity acts on all these levels of knowledge, and according to this activity of perception and reason, reason and reason are constantly moving into each other. It could also be said to characterize these different stages of knowledge that perceiving knowledge belongs to practical life, reasonable knowledge - the areas of individual sciences, and reasonable - philosophy. But here again, it should be remembered that such differences have a conditional meaning. Science relies on the experiences of practical life, and the acquisitions of the science itself are becoming little of the firm property of practical life, which the latter uses constantly in the preparation of judgment about certain objects. Philosophy is forced to intervene in the work of individual sciences so that, addresses and where it is necessary to configure, continue its further with its more general point of view, and as for individual sciences, the last parts against their will are forced to philosophize, if they do not want to lose their best share of their Results. That is why, since this necessity of mutual addition and assistance is conscious, there can be no speech about long disagreement between philosophy and science, just like between the last and practical life.